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BEHAVIORAL PUBLIC CHOICE AND THE CARBON TAX 
 
Gary M. Lucas, Jr.* 
 
Abstract 
In response to the historic Paris Agreement on climate change and 
to the Environmental Protection Agency’s recently finalized Clean Power 
Plan, economists and other climate policy experts have renewed the call 
for the United States to adopt a carbon tax. Opposition among the public 
presents a major obstacle. While a majority of the public supports 
government action on climate change, most people favor the use of 
“green” subsidies and command-and-control regulations—a fact that 
frustrates economists of all political stripes who contend that a carbon tax 
would be much cheaper and more effective. This Article argues that a 
cognitive bias known as opportunity cost neglect pervades the public’s 
thinking about climate policy instruments, causing people to ignore the 
hidden costs of subsidies and command-and-control and, for that reason, 
to support less efficient alternatives to the carbon tax. The Article will help 
proponents of the carbon tax better tailor their advocacy efforts. The 
Article also contributes to the burgeoning literature on behavioral public 
choice, which shows how the cognitive biases of political actors (including 
voters) influence the law. 
In addition, the Article points to the possibility of a Pyrrhic victory 
for conservative policymakers who oppose the carbon tax. Rather than 
averting major government action on global warming, defeating the 
carbon tax will very likely facilitate adoption of more costly substitutes 
that the public strongly favors as a result of cognitive bias. In that respect, 
the Article lends support to recent proposals by a small, but growing group 
of conservative scholars, who argue for a policy swap in which 
conservatives agree to a revenue-neutral carbon tax in exchange for 
support from environmentalists for abandoning the government’s current 
regulatory approach. The Article also suggests that conservative 
policymakers rethink their position on the carbon tax given that the states 
are currently considering which policy options to pursue in satisfying their 
respective obligations to reduce carbon emissions under the Clean Power 
Plan. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
Behavioral public choice (BPC) extends behavioral economics to politics and 
shows how human psychology influences the law and public policy. BPC is a 
relatively new field, but it has recently received significant attention from both legal 
scholars and economists.1  
Psychologists and behavioral economists have demonstrated that unlike the 
rational actors of economic theory, real people suffer from mental limitations and 
cognitive and emotional biases.2 A number of legal scholars have used these findings 
                                                      
1 See generally Gary M. Lucas, Jr. & Slavisa Tasic, Behavioral Public Choice and the 
Law, 118 W. VA. L. REV. 199, 200 (2015) (describing behavioral public choice as an 
“emerging field”); W. Kip Viscusi & Ted Gayer, Behavioral Public Choice: The Behavioral 
Paradox of Government Policy, 38 HARV. J.L. PUB. POL’Y 973, 974 (2015) (discussing 
behavioral public choice in the context of risk regulation); Jan Schnellenbach & Christian 
Schubert, Behavioral Public Choice: A Survey (Univ. of Freiburg, Working Paper No. 14/03, 
2014) (discussing possible avenues for future research in behavioral public choice). 
2 COLIN CAMERER, Individual Decision Making, in THE HANDBOOK OF EXPERIMENTAL 
ECONOMICS 587, 595–96 (John Kagel & Alvin Roth eds., 1995); DANIEL KAHNEMAN, 
THINKING, FAST AND SLOW 130–31 (2011); CASS SUNSTEIN, Introduction, in BEHAVIORAL 
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to justify government paternalism intended to save consumers and other market 
actors from their own irrational tendencies.3 Others have argued that the government 
should use subtle psychological “nudges” to elicit socially desirable behavior 
thereby correcting more conventional market failures, such as those caused by 
pollution and other spillovers.4 
By contrast, the BPC literature, rather than focusing on market failures, presents 
evidence that mental limitations and psychological biases influence politics. Three 
facts about politics explain why failures of rationality play a major role in shaping 
public policy.5  
First, rational, unbiased thinking often requires significant effort, and many 
people have little incentive to make that effort when acting in their capacity as 
political actors.6 A single vote rarely matters, so voters need not take elections very 
seriously.7 Moreover, voters, politicians, and bureaucrats know that the 
consequences of mistaken policies fall largely upon others.8 Under these 
circumstances, voters are free to indulge their biases, ideological or otherwise. 
Politicians and bureaucrats (who may themselves suffer from bias) often have little 
to gain by pointing out voters’ errors.9 
Second, law and policy are usually complex, and at the same time, most voters 
are woefully uninformed.10 Psychologists have found that when uninformed people 
                                                      
LAW AND ECONOMICS 1, 1–10 (Cass Sunstein ed., 2000); Jeremy A. Blumenthal, Emotional 
Paternalism, 35 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 1, 30–50 (2007). See generally THOMAS GILOVICH & 
DALE GRIFFIN, Introduction, in HEURISTICS AND BIASES: THE PSYCHOLOGY OF INTUITIVE 
JUDGMENT 1, 1–18 (Thomas Gilovich et al. eds., 2002) (exploring the psychology of 
judgment under uncertainty). 
3 E.g., Oren Bar-Gill & Elizabeth Warren, Making Credit Safer, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 
1–7 (2008) (proposing “the creation of a single regulatory body that will be responsible for 
evaluating the safety of consumer credit products”); Cass R. Sunstein, The Storrs Lectures: 
Behavioral Economics and Paternalism, 122 YALE L.J. 1826, 1834 (2013) (arguing that 
“behavioral market failures do, in fact, justify paternalism.”); Cass R. Sunstein & Richard 
H. Thaler, Libertarian Paternalism Is Not an Oxymoron, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 1159, 1160 
(2003) (arguing for libertarian paternalism). 
4 See generally CASS R. SUNSTEIN, SIMPLER: THE FUTURE OF GOVERNMENT 9–10 
(2013) (discussing the importance of “nudges” for the regulatory system); Russell Korobkin, 
Libertarian Welfarism, 97 CAL. L. REV. 1651, 1653 (2009) (discussing “libertarian 
welfarism”). 
5 For a more extensive discussion, see Lucas & Tasic, supra note 1, at 260–63. 
6 On the effort required to think rationally, see KAHNEMAN, supra note 2, at 31–49. 
7 On the odds of a single vote deciding an election, see DENNIS C. MUELLER, PUBLIC 
CHOICE III 304–05 (2003). 
8 Bryan Caplan, Majorities Against Utility: Implications of the Failure of the Miracle 
of Aggregation, 26 SOC. PHIL. & POL’Y 198, 207–08 (2008). 
9 Edward J. McCaffery & Jonathan Baron, Thinking About Tax, 12 J. PSYCHOL., PUB. 
POL’Y, & L. 106, 130 (2006). 
10 MICHAEL X. DELLI CARPINI & SCOTT KEETER, WHAT AMERICANS KNOW ABOUT 
POLITICS AND WHY IT MATTERS 62–104 (1996); ILYA SOMIN, DEMOCRACY AND POLITICAL 
IGNORANCE: WHY SMALLER GOVERNMENT IS SMARTER 17–61 (2013). 
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think about complex problems, they evaluate those problems superficially, relying 
on simple cues and decision heuristics that often lead to poor reasoning.11 
Finally, political actors usually have little opportunity to learn from their 
mistakes. The effects of government intervention are often ambiguous, and voters, 
politicians, and bureaucrats all have incentives to interpret the limited feedback that 
they receive in biased ways.12 
Although still developing, BPC scholarship has already shown that psychology 
exercises significant influence over the law. This Article adds to the literature by 
arguing that BPC can help legal scholars better understand the current debate 
surrounding proposals for a carbon tax. 
The Obama Administration has made climate change a top policy priority.13 In 
2015, the Administration negotiated the Paris Agreement on climate change, as part 
of which the United States and nearly two hundred other countries have pledged to 
significantly curtail carbon emissions.14 Moreover, the Environmental Protection 
Agency (EPA) recently finalized the Clean Power Plan, which establishes state-
specific limits on carbon emissions from power plants and requires that each state 
develop and implement a plan to achieve the required emissions reductions.15 The 
Administration has also strengthened automobile fuel efficiency standards.16 
In response to the Administration’s focus on global warming, economists and 
other climate policy experts have renewed the call for a carbon tax. Many 
economists have long supported a national carbon tax.17 More recently, a number of 
commentators have argued that, in satisfying their obligations under the Clean 
Power Plan, the states should use carbon taxes to reduce emissions.18 Despite this 
                                                      
11 See THOMAS GILOVICH ET AL., SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 281 (3d ed. 2013). 
12 E.g., Stephen J. Choi & A. C . Pritchard, Behavioral Economics and the SEC, 56 
STAN. L. REV. 1, 44–45 (2003). 
13 Climate Change and President Obama’s Action Plan, THE WHITE HOUSE, 
https://www.whitehouse.gov/climate-change [https://perma.cc/JJZ4-MHQE]. 
14 UNITED NATIONS, ADOPTION OF THE PARIS AGREEMENT 22 (2015), 
http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2015/cop21/eng/l09r01.pdf [https://perma.cc/HXY6-PJJ5]. 
15 Carbon Pollution Emissions Guidelines for Existing Stationary Sources: Electric 
Utility Generating Units, 80 Fed. Reg. 64,662 (Oct. 23, 2015) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 
60). A number of states are challenging the validity of the Clean Power Plan, and the case is 
currently pending before the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia 
Circuit. The Supreme Court recently entered an order staying implementation of the EPA’s 
regulation pending resolution of the case. West Virginia v. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 136 S. Ct. 
1000, 1000. (2016) (mem.). 
16 2017 and Later Model Year Light-Duty Vehicle Greenhouse Gas Emissions and 
Corporate Average Fuel Economy Standards, 77 Fed. Reg. 62,624, 62,626–27 (Oct. 15, 
2012). 
17 See infra Part I. 
18 E.g., Ben Gemen, Obama Climate Plan Revives Talk of a Carbon Tax, THE 
ATLANTIC, Aug. 3, 2015, http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2015/08/obama-
climate-plan-revives-talk-of-a-carbon-tax/447621/ [https://perma.cc/UU7V-Y768]; Adele 
Morris & Evan Weber, To Comply with the Clean Power Plan, States Should Tax Carbon, 
THE HILL: CONGRESS BLOG (Sept. 2, 2015, 11:30 AM), http://thehill.com/blogs/congress-
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strong support among policy experts, the public remains steadfastly opposed to 
taxing carbon.19 This Article argues that the reasons for the public’s opposition are 
largely psychological. The Article will help carbon tax proponents better tailor their 
advocacy efforts. 
Part I provides background by briefly describing why economists and many 
other experts favor a carbon tax as the best policy instrument for addressing global 
warming. A properly designed carbon tax would be much less expensive and more 
effective than command-and-control regulations, such as renewable portfolio 
standards, or “green” subsidies, such as tax credits for hybrid cars. 
Part II uses BPC to explain why the public disagrees with policy experts and 
rejects the carbon tax while at the same time strongly supporting regulations and 
subsidies that would cost more and be less effective. Specifically, Part II argues that 
support for these alternative policies often results from a particular cognitive bias 
known as opportunity cost neglect.20 The opportunity cost of a climate policy 
represents the tradeoff that the policy entails, or more specifically, the private and 
public goods that society must forgo because the government carries out the policy. 
All climate policies require that we sacrifice resources in exchange for 
improvements in environmental quality. But many policies, such as renewable 
portfolio standards and tax credits for hybrid cars, hide these tradeoffs from public 
view, whereas the carbon tax makes them at least somewhat salient. Substantial 
evidence indicates that, in general, the public favors policies that conceal tradeoffs, 
which largely explains why the carbon tax is at a disadvantage relative to other 
policies.21 While other scholars have also suggested that a carbon tax makes costs 
more salient than alternative policies,22 they have not identified opportunity cost 
neglect as the underlying psychological mechanism nor have they provided much 
empirical support for this claim. This Article is a first step toward filling that gap in 
the literature. 
Part III discusses the ramifications of opportunity cost neglect for both carbon 
tax advocates and opponents. To increase support for a carbon tax, advocates will 
have to convince the public that global warming is serious enough to warrant 
sacrifices and will also have to persuade the public that alternative policies do not 
offer a free lunch—environmental gain without any pain.  
By contrast, carbon tax opponents, many of whom are conservatives or 
libertarians, are currently winning in the court of public opinion. I suggest, however, 
the possibility of a Pyrrhic victory. Opposition by conservative policymakers to the 
carbon tax has not stopped the government from moving forward with alternative 
                                                      
blog/energy-environment/252476-to-comply-with-the-clean-power-plan-states-should-tax 
[https://perma.cc/D59A-MRST]. 
19 See infra Section II.B.4. 
20 Although I did not fully develop the idea, I first suggested that opportunity cost 
neglect influences public opinion with respect to the carbon tax in Gary M. Lucas, Jr., Out 
of Sight, Out of Mind: How Opportunity Cost Neglect Undermines Democracy, 9 N.Y.U. 
J.L. & LIBERTY 249, 298–300 (2015). 
21 See infra Section II.A. 
22 See infra Part II. 
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policies that conservatives arguably should find more repugnant, both because those 
policies are less efficient and because they entail greater government intrusion into 
the economy and people’s private lives. Because of opportunity cost neglect, the 
public strongly supports the government’s current regulatory approach even though 
it will likely prove unnecessarily expensive and possibly ineffective. As a result, my 
analysis bolsters recent proposals by a small but growing group of conservative 
scholars who argue for a policy swap—conservative policymakers would agree to a 
revenue-neutral carbon tax in exchange for support from environmentalists for the 
government’s abandoning command-and-control regulation and green subsidies.23 
On the other hand, Part III also argues that opportunity cost neglect will very 
likely make any real-world carbon tax that Congress adopts less efficient than 
traditional economic analysis would suggest. Part of the appeal of a carbon tax is 
that it could largely replace inefficient regulations and subsidies. But opportunity 
cost neglect causes the public to be incredibly fond of those alternative policies. And 
since those policies also appeal to certain environmental and industry groups, 
regulations and subsidies are unlikely to disappear completely with the advent of a 
carbon tax; the policies would instead coexist. 
This does not, however, mean that a carbon tax is a bad idea. In fact, I suggest 
that conservative policymakers would be better off supporting a carbon tax and 
steadfastly opposing inefficient policies. The current strategy of opposing any and 
all government action is not working and is likely to pave the way for the costly 
regulations and wasteful subsidies that conservatives deplore. Moreover, given that 
the states are currently developing plans to achieve the emissions reductions 
required by the Clean Power Plan, conservative policymakers could, by advocating 
that the states use carbon taxes in lieu of expensive regulations, help ensure that 
these emissions reductions come at the lowest possible cost. 
  
                                                      
23 John Cochrane, Carbon Tax or Carbon Rights, THE GRUMPY ECONOMIST (Jan. 5, 
2015, 1:34 PM), http://johnhcochrane.blogspot.com/2015/01/carbon-tax-or-carbon-
rights.html [https://perma.cc/ALY7-WU7R]; Amanda Little, This Conservative Economist 
Makes the Case for a Carbon Tax, GRIST (Oct. 12, 2015), http://grist.org/climate-
energy/this-conservative-economist-makes-the-case-for-a-carbon-tax/ [https://perma.cc/FM 
Z6-3MJ9] (interviewing Greg Mankiw, who argues for a policy swap); Jerry Taylor, The 
Conservative Case for a Carbon Tax, NISKANEN CENTER, 3–10 (March 23, 2015), 
http://niskanencenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/03/The-Conservative-Case-for-a-
Carbon-Tax1.pdf [https://perma.cc/AL8J-THY2]. The policy swap proposal has also 
received attention outside of conservative circles. See Ted Gayer, Addressing Climate 
Policy: The Next President Should Link a Carbon Tax to Fiscal and Environmental Reform, 
in CAMPAIGN 2012: TWELVE INDEPENDENT IDEAS FOR IMPROVING AMERICAN PUBLIC 
POLICY 189 , 189–98 (Benjamin Wittes ed., 2012); Nathan Richardson & Arthur G. Fraas, 
Comparing the Clean Air Act and a Carbon Price, RESOURCES FOR THE FUTURE, 22–23 
(May 2013), http://www.rff.org/files/sharepoint/WorkImages/Download/RFF-DP-13-
13.pdf [https://perma.cc/9KNB-ZVZX]. 
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I.  WHY ECONOMISTS PREFER A CARBON TAX 
 
On both the political right and left, economists generally favor a carbon tax as 
the primary policy tool for addressing global warming.24 For example, both Joseph 
Stiglitz, who was the chief economic advisor for President Bill Clinton, and Greg 
Mankiw, who was the chief economic advisor for President George W. Bush, are 
carbon tax advocates.25 This Part briefly discusses the primary reasons that 
economists tout the carbon tax. Section A explains why a carbon tax is attractive, 
and Section B describes some of the unattractive features of alternative policies. My 
goal is simply to provide enough background to facilitate understanding of the 
remainder of the Article, so the discussion here is not comprehensive.26 
 
A.  Attractive Features of a Carbon Tax 
 
The economic argument for a carbon tax starts from the premise that people 
who consume carbon-intensive goods impose a cost on society by contributing to 
global warming. Economists refer to this cost as a negative externality. Since the 
cost is external to producers who use carbon-intensive inputs and consumers of 
                                                      
24 See, e.g., Alan Krupnick & Ian Parry, What Is the Best Policy Instrument for 
Reducing CO2 Emissions?, in FISCAL POLICY TO MITIGATE CLIMATE CHANGE: A GUIDE FOR 
POLICYMAKERS 1, 1 (Ian Parry et al. eds., 2012) (“Carbon pricing policies . . . are easily the 
best instruments on the grounds of effectiveness, cost-effectiveness, and promoting clean 
technology investments.”); Ian Parry, Summary for Policymakers, in IMPLEMENTING A U.S. 
CARBON TAX xxiii, xxv (Ian Parry et al. eds., 2015) (stating that “there is near-universal 
agreement among economists that it [carbon pricing] will be essential if US emissions are 
ultimately to be rolled back at reasonable cost.”). For some examples of scholars and experts 
other than economists who support a carbon tax, see Jonathan H. Adler, A Conservative’s 
Approach to Combating Climate Change, THE ATLANTIC (May 30, 2012), 
http://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2012/05/a-conservatives-approach-to-
combating-climate-change/257827/ [https://perma.cc/59UJ-8YEU] (arguing in favor of a 
revenue-neutral carbon tax); MICHAEL J. GRAETZ, THE END OF ENERGY: THE UNMAKING OF 
AMERICA’S ENVIRONMENT, SECURITY, AND INDEPENDENCE 181 (2011); James Hansen et al., 
Assessing “Dangerous Climate Change”: Required Reduction of Carbon Emissions to 
Protect Young People, Future Generations and Nature, 8 PLOS ONE 1, 18–19 (2013). 
25 N. Gregory Mankiw, A Carbon Tax That America Could Live With, N.Y. TIMES 
(Aug. 31, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/09/01/business/a-carbon-tax-that-america-
could-live-with.html?_r=0 [https://perma.cc/XYF4-6H74]; Joseph E. Stiglitz, A Cool 
Calculus of Global Warming, PROJECT SYNDICATE (Nov. 9, 2006), http://www.project-
syndicate.org/commentary/a-cool-calculus-of-global-warming [https://perma.cc/Q6NG-
PJV3]. For more complete lists of economists (both conservative and liberal) who support a 
carbon tax, see SHI-LING HSU, THE CASE FOR A CARBON TAX 183–86 (2011); WILLIAM 
NORDHAUS, THE CLIMATE CASINO: RISK, UNCERTAINTY, AND ECONOMICS FOR A WARMING 
WORLD 314 (2013); Taylor, supra note 23, at 9–10, n.26; CARBON TAX CENTER, 
Conservatives, http://www.carbontax.org/conservatives/ [https://perma.cc/V9NH-5UEH].  
26 For more comprehensive discussions of the advantages of a carbon tax relative to 
other policies, see HSU, supra note 25, at 13–115; NORDHAUS, supra note 25, at 244–89. 
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carbon-intensive goods, producers and consumers can ignore it in their decision-
making. Because the prices of carbon-intensive goods and inputs do not reflect the 
carbon externality, firms and consumers buy more of them than they would if prices 
reflected all social costs.  
The simplest way to address this problem is to tax the goods in question, 
thereby increasing their price to reflect the full social cost of carbon emissions.27 The 
amount of the tax should equal the marginal social cost of emitting carbon, which 
economists can estimate using models that forecast the damage caused by global 
warming.28 By forcing producers and consumers to internalize the carbon 
externality, an optimal carbon tax would reduce carbon-intensive activities to the 
economically efficient level. 
In addition to its relative simplicity, a carbon tax possesses at least five other 
important features that make it an attractive policy. First, the government could 
apply it upstream directly to the limited number of firms that extract, process, and/or 
import fossil fuels.29 These fossil fuel suppliers would then pass most of the cost on 
to their customers who use fossil fuels to produce gasoline, electricity, and other 
carbon-intensive goods. As a result, the price of all goods would increase in 
                                                      
27 The economic case for a carbon tax is well established and it appears in many 
economics textbooks. See JONATHAN GRUBER, PUBLIC FINANCE AND PUBLIC POLICY 149–
55 (3d ed. 2011); HARVEY S. ROSEN & TED GAYER, PUBLIC FINANCE 85–94 (8th ed. 2008).  
28 Technically, the optimal carbon tax might be somewhat less than the marginal social 
cost of carbon emissions due to tax interaction effects. For estimates of the social cost of 
carbon, see William Nordhaus, Estimates of the Social Cost of Carbon: Concepts and Results 
from the DICE 2013-R Model and Alternative Approaches, 1 J. ASS’N ENVTL. & RESOURCE 
ECON. 273, 275 (2014) (estimating that the social cost of carbon in 2015 is $18.6 per ton of 
CO2 stated in 2005 dollars); U.S. GOV’T INTERAGENCY WORKING GROUP ON THE SOCIAL 
COST OF CARBON, SOCIAL COST OF CARBON FOR REGULATORY IMPACT ANALYSIS UNDER 
EXEC. ORDER 12866 1 (2010) (presenting estimates of the social cost of carbon that vary 
depending on the specified discount rate); U.S. GOV’T INTERAGENCY WORKING GROUP ON 
THE SOCIAL COST OF CARBON, TECHNICAL SUPPORT DOCUMENT: TECHNICAL UPDATE OF 
THE SOCIAL COST OF CARBON FOR REGULATORY IMPACT ANALYSIS UNDER EXEC. ORDER 
12866 (2013) (updating the working group’s 2010 estimates); U.S. GOV’T INTERAGENCY 
WORKING GROUP ON THE SOCIAL COST OF CARBON, TECHNICAL UPDATE OF THE SOCIAL 
COST OF CARBON FOR REGULATORY IMPACT ANALYSIS UNDER EXEC. ORDER 12866 (2013) 
(revising the working group’s 2013 estimates). See generally NICHOLAS STERN, STERN 
REVIEW: THE ECONOMICS OF CLIMATE CHANGE (2006) (reporting an influential, but highly 
controversial, estimate of the social cost of carbon); Richard S.J. Tol, The Social Cost of 
Carbon: Trends, Outliers and Catastrophes, 2 ECON.: THE OPEN-ACCESS, OPEN-
ASSESSMENT E-JOURNAL 1 (2008), http://dx.doi.org/10.5018/economics-ejournal.ja.2008-
25 [https://perma.cc/3BG3-HJF4] (reviewing numerous estimates of the social cost of 
carbon). 
29 See Jack Calder, Administration of a US Carbon Tax, in IMPLEMENTING A U.S. 
CARBON TAX 38, 44–51 (Ian Parry et al. eds., 2015); Gilbert E. Metcalf & David Weisbach, 
The Design of a Carbon Tax, 33 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 499, 501–29 (2009) (concluding that 
it would be possible for a carbon tax to cover virtually all carbon emissions from fossil fuel 
combustion by imposing the tax upstream at fewer than three thousand  points, such as coal 
mines and oil refineries). 
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proportion to their carbon intensity. A broad-based carbon tax would promote 
emissions reduction in all carbon-intensive sectors of the economy and ensure that 
resources are not inefficiently reallocated from taxed sectors to untaxed sectors. 
Second, because it would apply broadly, a carbon tax incentivizes virtually 
everyone who produces and consumes carbon-intensive goods to behave in ways 
that reduce emissions.30 For example, it would encourage consumers to drive more 
fuel-efficient cars and power companies to substitute renewable energy for coal and 
natural gas. 
Third, a broad-based carbon tax would reduce carbon emissions at the lowest 
possible cost.31 Many opportunities exist for abating emissions, but some cost more 
than others. By pricing emissions, an optimally designed carbon tax would ensure 
that carbon is emitted only if the benefits of doing so outweigh the costs, including 
the tax. Those producers and consumers who can abate emissions at a cost lower 
than the tax will do so. Those who cannot will simply pay the tax. Thus, a carbon 
tax effectively allocates emissions abatement to sources that can abate most cheaply. 
In economic terms, the marginal cost of abatement will be uniform (i.e., equal to the 
tax rate) across all activities and economic sectors so that no opportunities exist to 
cheaply reallocate abatement from one sector to another.32 
Fourth, a carbon tax would raise revenue. The government could use this 
revenue to fund public goods, to reduce the deficit, or to cut income and similar taxes 
that adversely affect economic growth by reducing the incentive to work and save.33 
In particular, using carbon tax revenue to cut distortionary taxes would dramatically 
reduce the cost of addressing global warming.34 
The government could also use carbon tax revenue to mitigate the regressive 
nature of the tax. Although substantial debate exists over exactly how regressive a 
carbon tax would be, one popular criticism of the tax is that the burden of it may fall 
more heavily on the poor than the rich because the poor spend a larger portion of 
their incomes on carbon-intensive goods.35 To reduce regressivity, the government 
                                                      
30 See NORDHAUS, supra note 25, at 224–25. 
31 See ROSEN & GAYER, supra note 27, at 87–88. 
32 Id. at 87. 
33 For discussions of the macroeconomic effects of using carbon taxes to cut the deficit 
or fund government spending, see Jared C. Carbone et al., Deficit Reduction and Carbon 
Taxes: Budgetary, Economic, and Distributional Impacts, RESOURCES FOR THE FUTURE, 
http://www.rff.org/files/sharepoint/WorkImages/Download/RFF-Rpt-Carbone.etal.Carbon 
Taxes.pdf [https://perma.cc/2X84-MDBX]; Roberton C. Williams III & Casey J. Wichman, 
Macroeconomic Effects of Carbon Taxes, in IMPLEMENTING A U.S. CARBON TAX 83, 89–91 
(Ian Parry et al. eds., 2015). A carbon tax can be a more efficient way to fund government 
spending than an income tax, but only if the carbon tax produces environmental benefits and 
only if it is not too large. Lawrence H. Goulder, Climate Change Policy’s Interactions with 
the Tax System, 40 ENERGY ECON. S3, S9–10 (2013).  
34 See Carbone et al., supra note 33, at 7–8; Goulder, supra note 33, at S6–8; Williams 
III & Wichman, supra note 33, at 84–89.  
35 See Adele Morris & Aparna Mathur, The Distributional Burden of a Carbon Tax: 
Evidence and Implications for Policy, in IMPLEMENTING A U.S. CARBON TAX 97, 101–07 
(Ian Parry et al. eds., 2015). But see Don Fullerton et al., Does the Indexing of Government 
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could give some carbon tax revenue to the poor (e.g., by mailing them a rebate check, 
by reducing regressive payroll taxes, or by increasing the earned income tax 
credit).36 Economists estimate that the government could eliminate the burden that a 
carbon tax imposes on the poor using only a small portion of carbon tax revenue, 
which would leave most of the revenue available for other purposes.37 
Finally, a carbon tax that includes carbon tariffs (sometimes called “border tax 
adjustments”) could address the problems of free riders and leakage.38 Climate 
change is a global problem and addressing it will require global cooperation. Yet 
each country has an incentive to free ride on the efforts of others while refusing to 
incur any abatement costs itself.39 Carbon tariffs offer a potential solution to this 
problem. For example, if China and India refuse to adopt climate policies of their 
own, the United States could tax imports from those countries, thereby giving them 
an incentive to change course.  
Carbon tariffs also mollify concerns about leakage, which occurs when firms 
shift production of carbon intensive goods to countries that do not tax or regulate 
carbon emissions.40 Tariffs reduce the benefits to firms of relocating to renegade 
countries that refuse to place a price on carbon. 
  
                                                      
Transfers Make Carbon Pricing Progressive?, 94 AM. J. AGRIC. ECON. 347, 352 (2012) 
(finding that, because carbon taxes increase prices, the automatic indexing of government 
transfers for inflation reduces the regressivity of a carbon tax); Kevin Hassett et al., The 
Incidence of a U.S. Carbon Tax: A Lifetime and Regional Analysis, 30 ENERGY J. 157, 169 
(2009) (concluding that carbon taxes are less regressive when analyzed with respect to 
measures of lifetime income rather than annual income); Sebastian Rauch et al., 
Distributional Implications of Alternative U.S. Greenhouse Gas Control Measures 41 (Natl’l 
Bureau Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 16053, 2010)  (finding that the regressivity of a 
carbon tax is reduced by the fact that “low income households derive a relatively large 
fraction of their income from transfers which insulates them from changes in capital and 
labor income.”). 
36 See generally Terry Dinan, Offsetting a Carbon Tax’s Burden on Low-Income 
Households, in IMPLEMENTING A U.S. CARBON TAX 120 (Ian Parry et al. eds., 2015). Lump-
sum rebates to the poor may be politically attractive, but they come at a large cost. Carbon 
tax revenue used in this fashion is unavailable to cut distortionary taxes. See infra Section 
III.A. 
37 See Aparna Mathur & Adele Morris, Distributional Effects of a Carbon Tax in 
Broader U.S. Fiscal Reform, 66 ENERGY POL’Y 326, 333 (2014). 
38 See HSU, supra note 25, at 95–100; Metcalf & Weisbach, supra note 29, at 540–52. 
But see Calder, supra note 29, at 57–59 (discussing the practical challenges of implementing 
carbon tariffs). 
39 See Metcalf & Weisbach, supra note 29, at 501–46. 
40 Id. at 546–47. 
2017] BEHAVORIAL PUBLIC CHOICE AND THE CARBON TAX 125 
 
B.  Unattractive Features of Alternative Policies 
 
Aside from a carbon tax, the government has three primary options for 
addressing global warming—cap-and-trade, command-and-control regulation, and 
green subsidies. This Section briefly describes why most economists find these 
alternative policies deficient when compared to a carbon tax. 
 
1.  Cap-and-Trade 
 
A carbon cap-and-trade program would have two primary features—the 
emissions cap and tradable permits. The emissions cap would limit the annual 
aggregate carbon emissions of firms to which it applies.41 The government would 
then distribute permits in an amount corresponding to the cap with each permit 
conferring the right to emit one ton of carbon.42 Covered firms would have to 
surrender a permit for each ton of carbon that they emitted during the year.43 After 
the government distributed the permits, firms could buy and sell them on a secondary 
market.44 
In theory, the government could implement a cap-and-trade program that would 
mimic the effects of the broad-based carbon tax described in Section A.45 The 
government could apply the emissions cap to fossil-fuel suppliers and force them to 
surrender permits when they extract, process, or import fossil fuels. Because the 
permits would be valuable, fossil-fuel suppliers would increase the prices of fossil 
fuels to reflect the opportunity cost associated with surrendering the permits as part 
of the production process.46 As a result—as with a carbon tax—prices of goods 
would increase in proportion to their carbon intensity. 
In addition, the government could initially distribute permits by auction and use 
the resulting revenue for the same purposes as it would use carbon tax revenue.47 In 
fact, a cap-and-trade program designed in this way would resemble a carbon tax in 
which the tax revenue is collected prior to emission rather than after. 
As I discuss in more detail below, because cap-and-trade and a carbon tax are 
close substitutes, this Article does not analyze in depth how or why public opinion 
with respect to the two policies differs.48 Instead, the Article focuses on public 
opinion regarding the carbon tax relative to more traditional command-and-control 
regulations and green subsidies.  
                                                      
41 See CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, AN EVALUATION OF CAP-AND-TRADE PROGRAMS FOR 
REDUCING U.S. CARBON EMISSIONS 5 (2001); Robert N. Stavins, A Meaningful U.S. Cap-
and-Trade System to Address Climate Change, 32 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 293, 298 (2008).  
42 See Stavins, supra note 41, at 298. 
43 Id. 
44 Id. at 326. 
45 See ROSEN & GAYER, supra note 27, at 90. 
46 See Stavins, supra note 41, at 310. 
47 Id. at 305. 
48 See infra Section II.B. 
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Having said that, I briefly note that many economists prefer a carbon tax to cap-
and-trade despite the fact that, in theory, the government could efficiently price 
carbon emissions using either approach.49 The reason is that a well-designed cap-
and-trade program would mimic a carbon tax, only it would add substantial 
complexity, which would likely lead to unforeseen problems. So why bother? 
In addition, in real-world cap-and-trade programs like the one governing carbon 
emissions in the European Union, the price of emissions permits has proven 
extremely volatile.50 In particular, during an economic recession, emissions decline 
naturally along with economic activity, and this can cause the price of permits to fall 
dramatically relative to periods in which permits are in high demand.51 Price 
volatility is bad because it introduces risk for investors and can increase costs.52 
Moreover, because it complicates planning, volatility can reduce the willingness of 
firms to develop clean technologies.53 A carbon tax resolves this problem because 
the price of emissions does not change unless the government changes the tax rate 
or the law provides that the initial rate changes automatically over time or upon the 
occurrence of certain events.54 
Another practical problem with cap-and-trade is that in order to reduce industry 
opposition to the policy, rather than auctioning permits, the government would likely 
give them away to firms that cap-and-trade would affect adversely.55 This is what 
happened with respect to the sulfur dioxide cap-and-trade program adopted in the 
United States and the carbon cap-and-trade program adopted in Europe.56 A cap-
and-trade program in which the government does not auction permits resembles a 
carbon tax in which the tax revenue is returned to polluting firms, and it creates 
windfall profits for shareholders.57 Moreover, giving permits away eliminates the 
possibility of reducing the program’s overall cost by using auction revenue to cut 
distortionary taxes.58 It also removes the mechanism for addressing the regressivity 
of climate policy. 
  
                                                      
49See NORDHAUS, supra note 25, at 241; Ian Parry, Choosing Among Mitigation 
Instruments, in IMPLEMENTING A U.S. CARBON TAX 18, 34–35 (Ian Parry et al. eds., 2015). 
50 See GRAETZ, supra note 24, at 207; NORDHAUS, supra note 25, at 235–39. 
51 See Krupnick & Parry, supra note 24, at 14. 
52 See NORDHAUS, supra note 25, at 239; Krupnick & Parry, supra note 24, at 14. 
53 See Krupnick & Parry, supra note 24, at 14. 
54 In theory, mechanisms exist for reducing the price volatility that plagues cap-and-
trade programs, but these mechanisms add significant complexity. See Krupnick & Parry, 
supra note 24, at 14–15 (“[T]he best way to provide price stability is simply to implement a 
carbon tax . . . instead of a cap-and-trade system.”). 
55 See GRAETZ, supra note 24, at 235–36; Parry, supra note 49, at 34 (“The Waxman-
Markey ETS bill was not designed to provide a large new source of federal government 
revenue—at least initially, only 7 percent of the allowances were to be auctioned for the 
purpose of deficit reduction (most of the allowances were to be set aside for compensation 
schemes or to fund energy-related spending).”). 
56 GRAETZ, supra note 24, at 207. 
57 Morris & Mathur, supra note 35, at 100. 
58 Goulder, supra note 33, at S7. 
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Of course, the government could, in theory, give carbon tax revenue to polluters 
just as easily as it could give them pollution permits. But in reality, sending large 
checks to coal, oil, and power companies would render the obviously unfair nature 
of the transfer scheme easily visible to the media and public in a way that handing 
out pollution permits would not. 
 
2.  Command-and-Control Regulation 
 
Command-and-control regulations generally mandate that a polluter adopt a 
particular pollution abatement technology or achieve a minimal level of performance 
in reducing pollution.59 Examples include regulations that impose fuel efficiency 
requirements on automobile manufacturers and regulations that require power 
companies to produce electricity from renewable sources rather than fossil fuels. 
Regulation has a number of drawbacks, making it highly likely that achieving 
a given amount of emissions reduction using command-and-control would be much 
more expensive than if the government opted for a carbon tax instead.60 First, the 
government is unlikely to regulate all sources of emissions because doing so would 
require a massive amount of intrusion into the economy as well as people’s private 
lives. This means missing out on many opportunities to cheaply abate emissions.61 
For example, fuel efficiency standards do not incentivize people to drive fewer 
miles. 
Second, choosing the most cost-effective abatement technology or the optimal 
performance standard for various industries requires detailed information that the 
government usually does not have—much more information than is needed to 
impose an optimal carbon tax.62 Moreover, political considerations inevitably 
influence the regulatory process as powerful special interest groups lobby for 
regulations that will benefit them and harm competitors without concern for 
environmental objectives.63 
Third, the two problems already mentioned imply that, under any real-world 
regulatory scheme, the marginal cost of abatement will vary greatly across economic 
sectors.64 For example, the marginal cost of abatement in the transportation sector 
may significantly exceed the marginal cost of abatement in electricity generation. In 
that case, society could achieve the same level of emissions reduction more cheaply 
by allowing greater emissions from automobiles while reducing emissions by power 
companies. A carbon tax avoids this problem by creating a uniform price for 
emissions. Everyone facing that price has an incentive to reduce emissions until the 
marginal cost of doing so exceeds the tax. 
                                                      
59 ROSEN & GAYER, supra note 27, at 94–95. 
60 ALAN J. KRUPNICK ET AL., RESOURCES FOR THE FUTURE, TOWARD A NEW NATIONAL 
ENERGY POLICY: ASSESSING THE OPTIONS 69–112 (2010); NORDHAUS, supra note 25, at 
260–61. 
61 Parry, supra note 49, at 27. 
62 See HSU, supra note 25, at 59. 
63 Id. 
64 See GRUBER, supra note 27, at 142–143. 
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Fourth, regulations, like a carbon tax, harm the poor more than the rich, but, 
unlike a carbon tax, do not produce revenue that the government can use to rectify 
this problem. As with a carbon tax, regulations increase the costs of firms that 
produce carbon-intensive goods. And as with a tax, firms pass these costs on to 
consumers in the form of higher prices for cars, electricity, and other regulated 
products.65 Because the poor spend a greater percentage of their incomes on carbon-
intensive goods, the burden of the price increases that result from regulation falls 
disproportionately on the poor.  
Finally, polluters who adopt the government’s required technology or who 
satisfy the applicable performance standard have no further incentive to reduce 
emissions.66 By comparison, a carbon tax encourages polluters to reduce emissions 
until they are completely eliminated as long as the marginal cost of abatement is less 
than the tax.  
Because of these undesirable features of regulation, the economist William 
Nordhaus, who is arguably the world’s leading authority on the economics of global 
warming, concludes that “[r]egulatory policies alone cannot come close to solving 
the global warming problem by themselves.”67 Nordhaus concedes that “[c]arefully 
designed regulations in a few areas” might play a beneficial role, but he also warns 
that “regulations can be very costly or even counterproductive if they are not 
carefully designed.”68 Based on his review of the evidence, Nordhaus concludes that 
a “typical finding is that using inefficient regulations or approaches will double the 
costs” of global warming mitigation and would likely render infeasible attempts to 
limit the global temperature increase to levels that many climate scientists 
recommend.69 
Nordhaus is not alone in his belief that regulation would prove more expensive 
than a carbon tax. In a University of Chicago poll of over fifty distinguished 
academic economists, only one disagreed with the following statement: “A tax on 
the carbon content of fuels would be a less expensive way to reduce carbon-dioxide 
emissions than would a collection of policies such as ‘corporate average fuel 
economy’ requirements for automobiles.”70 
 
                                                      
65 HSU, supra note 25, at 127. Prices would increase less as a result of regulations than 
as a result of a comparably scaled carbon tax, but the regulations would also not generate 
revenue.  
66 HSU, supra note 25, at 65–66. 
67 NORDHAUS, supra note 25, at 272. 
68 Id. 
69 Id. at 179. 
70 The one economist who disagreed stated that the question asked “compares two 
ineffective approaches. The magnitude of this problem is so great that no sufficient carbon 
tax is feasible worldwide.” Four of the economists surveyed either did not respond or 
responded that they were uncertain. Carbon Tax, CHICAGO BOOTH, IGM FORUM (Dec. 20, 
2011 1:48 PM) http://www.igmchicago.org/surveys/carbon-tax [https://perma.cc/43AM-
A2R8]. 
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3.  Green Subsidies 
 
At various times, the government has attempted to reduce carbon emissions by 
subsidizing (ostensibly) environmentally friendly goods and technologies. 
Examples include the income tax credit for hybrid cars and subsidies for corn-based 
ethanol, the hydrogen fuel cell, and carbon sequestration technology. 
These subsidies are notoriously problematic. First, rather than pricing carbon 
and incentivizing millions of producers and consumers to find imaginative (and 
cheap) ways to reduce emissions, subsidies require that the government identify the 
low-carbon activities and technologies worth subsidizing. The task simply requires 
too much information that the government cannot easily obtain.71 
Second, special interest groups and practical politics inevitably play a 
significant role in determining what the government subsidizes, often to the 
detriment of environmental objectives.72 Given the influence of special interest 
groups, it comes as no surprise that a study commissioned by Congress of tax code 
provisions affecting carbon emissions, including the major energy-related tax 
expenditures, concluded that “[v]ery little if any [greenhouse gas] reductions are 
achieved at substantial cost with these provisions.”73 In fact, careful analysis 
suggests that ethanol subsidies supported by the farm lobby are actually 
counterproductive.74 
Finally, subsidies are expensive.75 The government must pay for them via 
deficit spending or by increasing distortionary taxes like the income tax. 
For these reasons, economists are generally skeptical of green subsidies.76 The 
government might productively subsidize basic research related to climate change 
and renewable energy,77 but it has a poor track record when it comes to subsidizing 
specific technologies.78  
To summarize, economists argue that a carbon tax is superior to subsidies as 
well as command-and-control regulation. Importantly, adoption of a carbon tax 
would not rule out also pursuing these other policies. But economists generally view 
subsidies and regulation as having at best a minor role in any optimal scheme for 
                                                      
71 GRAETZ, supra note 24, at 186–87; NORDHAUS, supra note 25, at 202. 
72 GRAETZ, supra note 24, at 187–95; HSU, supra note 25, at 53–59. 
73 NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, EFFECTS OF U.S. TAX POLICY ON GREENHOUSE GAS 
EMISSIONS 8 (William Nordhaus et al. eds., 2013), http://www.climateactionproject.com/ 
docs/NAS_study.pdf [https://perma.cc/HH55-M2KV]. 
74 Id. at 98–99. 
75 GRAETZ, supra note 24, at 185–92; NORDHAUS, supra note 25, at 266. 
76 HSU, supra note 25, at 121 (“No reputable economist believes that, even in theory, 
subsidization can play any more than a supplementary role in reducing greenhouse gases.”). 
77 NORDHAUS, supra note 25, at 289; Richard G. Newell, The Role of Energy 
Technology Policy Alongside Carbon Pricing, in IMPLEMENTING A U.S. CARBON TAX 178, 
188 (Ian Parry et al. eds., 2015); David Popp, Innovation and Climate Policy, 2 ANN. REV. 
RESOURCE ECON. 275, 285–88 (2010). 
78 See e.g., HSU, supra note 25, at 53–59. 
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controlling carbon emissions.79 As a result, the public’s support for subsidies and 
regulation is not irrational per se. But it is difficult to understand why the public 
strongly favors potential solutions that economists and other experts believe are 
seriously flawed, while at the same time it strongly opposes the solution that experts 
regard as clearly superior. The next Part attempts to explain this apparent paradox 
of public opinion. 
 
II.  WHY THE PUBLIC PREFERS COMMAND-AND-CONTROL REGULATION AND 
GREEN SUBSIDIES 
 
Opinion surveys consistently find that a majority of the American public 
expresses support for government action to address global warming.80 We have seen 
that economists argue that a broad-based carbon tax is the best policy available to 
the government for this purpose. Yet most surveys also find that the public strongly 
opposes a carbon tax.81 Instead, Americans support command-and-control 
regulation and green subsidies that would likely be less effective and cost 
significantly more. This divide between expert and lay opinion matters because 
research by political scientists suggests that the public exercises significant influence 
over government policy.82  
                                                      
79 See infra Section III.D. 
80 See infra Section II.B. 
81 See infra Section II.B. 
82 See e.g., Paul Burstein, The Impact of Public Opinion on Public Policy: A Review 
and an Agenda, 56 POL. RES. Q. 29, 36 (2003) (“Public opinion affects policy three-quarters 
of the times its impact is gauged; its effect is of substantial policy importance at least a third 
of the time, and probably a fair amount more.”); Brandice Canes-Wrone et al., Out of Step, 
Out of Office: Electoral Accountability and House Members’ Voting, 96 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 
127, 138 (2002) (noting that “we show that, holding district ideology constant, in every 
election between 1956 and 1996 an incumbent’s vote share decreased the more he voted with 
the extreme of his party . . . [and] the probability [of reelection] decreases significantly as an 
incumbent’s voting support for his party increases”). But see Steven D. Levitt, How Do 
Senators Vote? Disentangling the Role of Voter Preferences, Party Affiliation, and Senator 
Ideology, 86 AM. ECON. REV. 425, 438 (1996) (concluding that “ideology is the primary 
determinant” of how U.S. senators vote, that “[l]ess than one quarter of the weight in the 
[senator’s] decision function is devoted to voter preferences,” and that public opinion matters 
more in election years or if the senator holds a marginal seat). For further discussion of the 
role of public opinion, see BRUCE ACKERMAN & JAMES S. FISHKIN, DELIBERATION DAY 9–
10 (2004); ILYA SOMIN, DEMOCRACY AND POLITICAL IGNORANCE: WHY SMALLER 
GOVERNMENT IS SMARTER 6, 97 (2013); JAMES A. STIMSON, TIDES OF CONSENT: HOW 
PUBLIC OPINION SHAPES AMERICAN POLITICS 9 (2004). Despite the evidence that public 
opinion matters, a recent article by Martin Gilens and Benjamin Page purports to show that 
“the preferences of the average American appear to have only a miniscule, near-zero, 
statistically non-significant impact upon public policy” and that policy instead reflects the 
preferences of economic elites and business interest groups. Martin Gilens & Benjamin I. 
Page, Testing Theories of American Politics: Elites, Interest Groups, and Average Citizens, 
12 PERSP. POL. 564, 575 (2014). But Omar Bashir has challenged Gilens and Page arguing 
that their study suffers from statistical flaws that undermine its conclusions. See generally 
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Why then does the public disagree with economists about the carbon tax? One 
popular explanation is that, because of anti-tax propaganda, the public suffers from 
tax label aversion and irrationally opposes any policy proposal that contains the 
word “tax” in it.83 But the evidence for tax label aversion is mixed. On one hand, a 
study by David Hardisty and his colleagues found experimental evidence of tax label 
aversion.84 Subjects in Hardisty’s study read descriptions of various policies that 
would increase the price of certain carbon-intensive goods and use the money 
generated by the price increases to fund alternative energy sources or carbon 
sequestration technologies.85 For some subjects, Hardisty described the price 
increases as resulting from a carbon tax, but for others, he used the phrase “carbon 
offset” instead.86 Hardisty found that subjects, and especially those who described 
themselves as independents or Republicans, “were more supportive of regulation 
when the cost increase was described as a carbon offset than when it was described 
as a carbon tax.”87 
On the other hand, a survey by Ana Villar and Jon Krosnick contradicts the tax 
label aversion hypothesis.88 In their survey, Villar and Krosnick asked some 
participants whether the federal government should address global warming by 
“[i]ncreasing gasoline prices so people either drive less or buy cars that use less 
gas.”89 They asked other subjects whether they favored “[i]ncreasing taxes on 
gasoline so people either drive less or buy cars that use less gas.”90 Villar and 
Krosnick found that roughly 30% of participants supported “increasing gasoline 
prices,” while roughly 35% supported “increasing taxes on gasoline”—a difference 
that was not statistically significant.91 This suggests that people are averse to 
incurring higher costs, even if the cost is not labeled a tax. 
A second possibility is that the costs associated with a carbon tax are more 
salient than those associated with regulation and subsidies. This hypothesis is not 
                                                      
Omar Bashir, Testing Inferences About American Politics: A Review of the ‘Oligarchy’ 
Result, 2 RESEARCH & POL. 1, 1–2 (2015) (critiquing Gilens and Page). 
83 GRAETZ, supra note 24, at 181–85 (arguing that a carbon tax is the best policy option, 
but blaming the failure to adopt it on the anti-tax movement); NORDHAUS, supra note 25, at 
259 (“Part of the difficulty is that people resist raising the price of energy goods and services, 
particularly if it takes the form of taxes. This sentiment is widely shared around the world, 
although the United States exhibits an extreme allergy to taxes in its rhetoric and politics.”); 
Shi-Ling Hsu et al., Pollution Tax Heuristics: An Empirical Study of Willingness to Pay 
Higher Gasoline Taxes, 36 ENERGY POL’Y 3612, 3613–14 (2008) (describing a “severe 
North American allergy to taxes”).  
84 David J. Hardisty et al., A Dirty Word or a Dirty World? Attribute Framing, Political 
Affiliation, and Query Theory, 21 PSYCHOL. SCI. 86, 88 (2010). 
85 Id. at 87. 
86 Id. 
87 Id. at 88. 
88 See Ana Villar & Jon A. Krosnick, Global Warming vs. Climate Change, Taxes vs. 
Prices: Does Word Choice Matter?, 105 CLIMATE CHANGE 1, 10 (2011). 
89 Id. (emphasis added). 
90 Id. (emphasis added).  
91 Id. 
132 UTAH LAW REVIEW [NO. 1 
new, but no one has adequately explained the psychological mechanism underlying 
the phenomenon or provided much in the way of empirical support for its 
existence.92  
This Part addresses that gap in the literature by arguing that a cognitive bias 
known as opportunity cost neglect largely explains the public’s puzzling views with 
respect to climate policy instruments. Section A explains what opportunity cost 
neglect is and briefly discusses evidence that it affects public opinion with respect 
to a variety of policies outside the climate context. This discussion provides the 
background necessary to understand Section B, which focuses specifically on global 
warming and argues that opportunity cost neglect influences public opinion 
regarding the policy instruments the government should use to address it. 
 
A.  Opportunity Cost Neglect and Public Opinion  
 
Before choosing a particular option, a rational decision maker considers its 
opportunity cost, which is the value of the best alternative that the decisionmaker 
forgoes by choosing the option in question.93 For example, a rational consumer 
deciding between an expensive or a cheap TV would take into account the best 
alternative use of the money that she would save by buying the cheaper model. If 
the best alternative use for that money is buying DVDs, then the consumer would 
not purchase the expensive TV unless its superior quality makes it more attractive 
than the cheap TV plus the DVDs. 
Despite this compelling logic, real people (as opposed to the rational actors of 
economic theory) often neglect opportunity costs, especially if those costs are not 
obvious from the context in which people encounter the choices that they make. As 
a result, researchers have found that they can alter people’s consumption decisions 
simply by manipulating the decision frame so as to make opportunity costs more or 
less salient.94 
To illustrate, consider a study by Shane Frederick in which he presented his 
subjects with two options: they could either purchase a video for $14.99 or not.95 
                                                      
92 The scholar whose work is most closely related to my own is Shi-Ling Hsu. Hsu has 
argued that the public suffers from three psychological biases that place the carbon tax at a 
disadvantage relative to other climate change policies: (1) the do no harm effect; (2) the 
identifiability effect; and (3) the endowment effect. HSU, supra note 25, at 147–80. Although 
he does not discuss opportunity cost neglect, Hsu does draw attention to the fact that the 
carbon tax highlights the burden imposed on society in addressing climate change.  
93 Armen Alchian, Cost, in 3 INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 
404, 404–15 (David L. Sills ed., 1968); JAMES M. BUCHANAN, COST AND CHOICE: AN 
INQUIRY IN ECONOMIC THEORY 7 (1969); N. GREGORY MANKIW, PRINCIPLES OF 
MICROECONOMICS 6 (4th ed. 2007). 
94 See Shane Frederick et al., Opportunity Cost Neglect, 36 J. CONSUMER RES. 553, 554 
(2009); Steven K. Jones et al., Choices and Opportunities: Another Effect of Framing on 
Decisions, 11 J. BEHAV. DECISION MAKING 211, 223 (1998); Stephen A. Spiller, Opportunity 
Cost Consideration, 38 J. CONSUMER RES. 595, 600 (2011). 
95 Frederick et al., supra note 94, at 554. 
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Frederick manipulated the “not buy” option so that for control subjects, it was 
worded as “Not buy this entertaining video,” but for subjects in the treatment group, 
it included the phrase “Keep the $14.99 for other purchases.”96 Frederick intended 
for the latter phrase to evoke opportunity costs. His manipulation worked and caused 
subjects in the treatment group to be much less willing to purchase the video.97 This 
result is somewhat astonishing given that all of the subjects in both the control and 
treatment groups had in front of them the price of the item in question. Yet for many 
subjects, Frederick was able to reduce their willingness to pay simply by reminding 
them of the seemingly obvious fact that not buying the video would make the money 
saved available for other purchases. This study and others like it show that, in the 
absence of cues that trigger thoughts about tradeoffs, people do not always 
automatically consider opportunity costs, even when they are faced with familiar 
consumer transactions in which prices are explicitly stated. 
Opportunity cost neglect is a specific instance of a more general phenomenon 
that psychologists refer to as focusing illusion.98 People frequently fail to take 
account of all information relevant to a given problem. They instead accept the frame 
or characterization of the problem as they encounter it and passively restrict their 
thoughts to salient elements, especially information presented explicitly.99 Implicit 
information, though relevant, often remains “off screen.” 
Opportunity costs sometimes remain off screen because they are not obvious 
from the context. For example, when people are deciding whether to buy a particular 
product, they sometimes focus on whether they like the product itself and do not 
think about other options for spending their money—options that remain implicit.100 
This tendency biases consumers toward making purchases when, as is often the case, 
the product itself is obviously attractive or appears attractive due to clever 
advertising. 
Most research on opportunity cost neglect focuses on consumer decision 
making, but in a recent article, I presented evidence that opportunity cost neglect 
                                                      
96 Id. at 555. 
97 Id. 
98 Some scholars refer to the same phenomenon as “focusing effects,” “focusing 
failures,” “focusing bias,” “focusing,” or “isolation effects.” Lorraine Chen Idson et al., 
Overcoming Focusing Failures in Competitive Environments, 17 J. BEHAV. DECISION 
MAKING 159, 160 (2004); Jones et al., supra note 94, at 213–14; Daniel Kahneman & Dan 
Lovallo, Timid Choices and Bold Forecasts: A Cognitive Perspective on Risk Taking, 39 
MGMT. SCI. 17, 20 (1993); Paolo Legrenzi et al., Focussing in Reasoning and Decision 
Making, 49 COGNITION 36, 58–64 (1993); McCaffery & Baron, supra note 9, at 107. 
99 For reviews of the relevant literature, see Frederick et al., supra note 94, at 553–54; 
Daniel Kahneman, Maps of Bounded Rationality: Psychology for Behavioral Economics, 93 
AM. ECON. REV. 1449, 1458–60 (2003); Spiller, supra note 94, at 596.  
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(2004) [hereinafter Posavac et al., Positivity Effect]. 
134 UTAH LAW REVIEW [NO. 1 
also affects the public’s policy preferences.101 Opinion surveys show that the public 
strongly supports spending on virtually all of the programs that constitute a 
significant part of government budgets.102 The public also favors government 
regulation of numerous aspects of the economy and approves of many of the most 
costly tax expenditures.103 These facts about public opinion are true not just of 
liberals and Democrats. Surprisingly enough, conservatives and Republicans also 
endorse many government interventions as long as researchers refrain from asking 
them about government in the abstract and instead ask about specific programs.104 
Nevertheless, the public’s support for many government programs is 
superficial. It declines (often substantially) when researchers frame their questions 
in ways that draw attention to opportunity costs.105 The opportunity cost of a 
government program includes the goods and services (whether public or private) 
that society must do without because the program exists. All government 
interventions—whether in the form of spending, regulation, or tax expenditures—
impose opportunity costs because they reallocate scarce economic resources from 
one activity to another. This fact, however, seems lost on the public. 
Consider, for example, public support for government spending. When 
researchers do not refer explicitly to the tradeoffs involved, surveys generally find 
substantial support for maintaining or increasing spending on virtually every major  
 
 
                                                      
101 See generally Lucas, supra note 20, at 264–303 (developing much of the material in 
this Section). 
102 NAT’L PUB. RADIO, KAISER FAMILY FOUNDATION, & HARVARD KENNEDY SCHOOL 
OF GOV’T, POLL: ATTITUDES TOWARD GOVERNMENT 18–23 (2000), 
http://kaiserfamilyfoundation.files.wordpress.com/2013/01/npr-kaiser-kennedy-school-
poll-attitudes-toward-government.pdf [https://perma.cc/PNG2-5JPR]; PEW RESEARCH 
CENTER, AS SEQUESTER DEADLINE LOOMS, LITTLE SUPPORT FOR CUTTING MOST 
PROGRAMS 10 (2013), http://www.people-press.org/files/legacy-pdf/02-22-13%20Spending 
%20Release.pdf [https://perma.cc/8YHL-UMFJ]; Christopher Faricy & Christopher Ellis, 
Public Attitudes Toward Social Spending in the United States: The Differences Between 
Direct Spending and Tax Expenditures, 36 POL. BEHAV. 53, 56–57 (2014). 
103 NAT’L PUB. RADIO, KAISER FAMILY FOUNDATION, & HARVARD KENNEDY SCHOOL 
OF GOV’T, supra note 102, at 23; Siona Robin Listokin et al., Americans’ Preferences for 
Tax Increases and Spending Cuts, 139 TAX NOTES 188, 190–92 (2013); Slavisa Tasic, The 
Modern Growth of Government Springs More from Ideas Than from Vested Interests, 14 
INDEP. REV. 549, 553 (2010). People often oppose both regulation and government spending 
in the abstract and answer yes to generic questions such as, “Does the government regulate 
business too much or waste money?.” Yet the public favors regulation and spending when 
pollsters avoid generic questions and ask about specific programs. BRYAN CAPLAN, THE 
MYTH OF THE RATIONAL VOTER 62–63 (2007). 
104 PEW RESEARCH CENTER, supra note 102, at 3; Faricy & Ellis, supra note 102, at 56–
57; Stephen Miller, Conservatives and Liberals on Economics: Expected Differences, 
Surprising Similarities, 19 CRITICAL REV. 47, 50 (2007). 
105 Lucas, supra note 20, at 275–302. 
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government program.106 But that support diminishes, especially for military 
spending, when survey questions highlight the seemingly obvious fact that the 
government could use spending cuts to reduce the budget deficit.107 
Similarly, in an early study, Eva Mueller found strong support for increasing 
spending on various government programs as long as she did not ask survey 
participants how to pay the additional cost.108 But in a follow-up question that raised 
the specter of tax hikes, she found that no program was popular enough that a 
majority was willing to raise taxes to increase funding for it.109 Mueller was also 
able to rule out the possibility that study participants wanted to increase spending on 
certain programs and pay for it, not through tax increases, but by cutting spending 
on other programs that they favored less.110 That explanation conflicted with the fact 
that, in response to Mueller’s initial question, the participants expressed little 
support for cutting spending on any program other than foreign aid.111 Instead, 
mentioning taxes apparently cued participants to think about opportunity costs, 
which they had initially neglected to consider and which diminished their support 
for greater spending. 
The public’s neglect of the opportunity costs of government spending is 
consistent with focusing illusion. Many of the benefits of government spending 
programs are obvious. In fact, many programs have such benign-sounding names 
(e.g., “national defense” and “education and job training”) that it seems almost 
immoral to oppose them.112 At the same time, the opportunity costs of these 
programs are implicit and easy to overlook. In particular, the payment of taxes 
generally is not connected to the receipt of government benefits, so the benefits of 
government spending can feel as though they are free.113 
Moreover, most people know very little about how much the government 
actually spends on various programs.114 And even if people bothered to look at 
government budgets, the figures involved are so large and unfamiliar that most 
would find it difficult to translate them into something that concretely and 
meaningfully represents the implicit tradeoffs. Recall that Shane Frederick and other 
                                                      
106 See PEW RESEARCH CENTER, supra note 102, at 3. 
107 Lucas, supra note 20, at 281–89. 
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of Savings and Debt, 17 MARKETING SCI. 4, 8–25 (1998). 
114 Fred Barbash, What They Don’t Know About the Deficit, CQ WEEKLY (June 11, 
2011 10:32 AM), http://public.cq.com/docs/weeklyreport/weeklyreport-000003886498 
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researchers have found that people neglect opportunity costs even when they are 
faced with explicit prices in the context of familiar consumer transactions. We 
should expect then that opportunity cost neglect would be particularly severe with 
respect to government spending because of the complex and unfamiliar nature of the 
choices involved. 
For example, one way to rationally think about whether the government should 
purchase ten F-35 Joint Strike Fighter jets would be to consider that the opportunity 
cost of doing so is approximately forty-nine elementary schools or eighteen high 
schools.115 This example makes clear that devoting scarce resources to one activity 
(the military) means taking those resources away from another activity (public 
education). But because people do not directly pay for either the military or public 
education, they are unlikely to make this connection on their own. 
The tendency to neglect opportunity costs is likely even more pronounced with 
respect to government regulation and tax expenditures than it is for spending 
programs.116 The word “spend” implies an outflow of money or a dollar cost. So 
even though they may have difficulty processing the large amounts involved, at least 
some people probably think about tradeoffs when considering whether the 
government should spend more money. 
By contrast, for regulations and tax expenditures, the dollar cost of the 
intervention is hidden—not just the exact amount, but the fact that there is any cost 
at all.117 Regulations, for example, impose costs on producers, many of which they 
pass on to consumers in the form of higher prices. But regulations do not require a 
monetary outlay by the government, so the costs are not obvious and are difficult to 
measure, even for policy experts. Similarly, tax expenditures reduce tax revenue, 
which leads to tax rate hikes, a larger budget deficit, and/or spending cuts in other 
areas. But politicians usually portray tax expenditures as involving tax cuts, which 
de-emphasizes tradeoffs. The result is that many people fail to recognize that 
regulations and tax expenditures impose monetary costs. Under these circumstances, 
people will almost assuredly not take the next step and consider that incurring these 
                                                      
115 F-35 Fighters are scheduled for full-rate production in 2019 at an estimated cost of 
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costs means that society must forgo other opportunities for exploiting its 
resources.118 Why then would anyone oppose regulations intended to promote 
occupational safety or tax expenditures that ostensibly encourage home ownership? 
Turning specifically to tax expenditures, if they do in fact make opportunity 
costs less salient than direct spending, then increasing the salience of opportunity 
costs should reduce support for tax expenditures more than for similar direct 
spending programs. A study by Jake Haselswerdt and Brandon Bartels supports this 
hypothesis.119 Haselswerdt and Bartels presented subjects with two scenarios.120 In 
the first, a government program made homes more affordable by allowing 
homeowners to deduct home mortgage interest for tax purposes.121 In the second 
scenario, instead of the home mortgage interest deduction, the government made 
cash payments to individuals who borrowed money to buy a home.122 The 
researchers informed some subjects that the housing subsidy (whether in the form 
of a mortgage interest deduction or a cash grant) would add $390 billion to the 
national debt over the next four years.123 Other subjects did not receive this cost 
information.124 Haselswerdt and Bartels found that referring to the subsidy’s effects 
on the national debt reduced support for it no matter which way the program was 
framed (tax deduction or cash grant).125 This result is unsurprising given the 
evidence of opportunity cost neglect presented above. More importantly, the 
reduction was even greater for the home mortgage interest deduction than for the 
comparable direct spending program.126 
The best explanation for this finding is that without cues evoking opportunity 
costs, many participants failed to consider them.127 The reference to the national debt 
triggered consideration of opportunity costs, which reduced support for the program 
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regardless of its form. Nonetheless, the effect was greater for the home mortgage 
interest deduction. Without cues, subjects were less likely to think about the 
opportunity cost of the deduction than of the cash grant. At least some people 
probably realized that cash grants would either add to the national debt or necessitate 
tax increases, and this fact alone caused them to spontaneously consider alternative 
uses for the money even without prompting by researchers. 
To summarize, this Section has argued that opportunity cost neglect plays a 
significant role in the public’s enthusiasm for all types of government intervention. 
The next Section turns specifically to a discussion of opportunity cost neglect and 
its influence on the public’s preferences with respect to climate policy instruments.  
But first, I briefly digress to note that I do not intend for the discussion in this 
Section to imply that, in general, the public’s support for government programs is 
excessive and irrational. While many of the benefits of government programs are 
obvious, some may not be.128 In particular, some scholars argue that the public 
underestimates the positive effects of certain programs (including programs 
intended to address climate change), and this is especially likely when the benefits 
occur indirectly or in the distant future.129 If that is the case, then the tendency to 
underestimate these hidden benefits of government could partially, fully, or more 
than fully counteract opportunity cost neglect with respect to particular areas in 
which the government intervenes. In other words, two different biases—opportunity 
cost neglect and the tendency to underestimate the hidden benefits of government—
may simultaneously affect public opinion, but act in opposite directions. For 
purposes of this Article, I do not claim that one bias is always more important than 
the other. Either bias could adversely influence public opinion with respect to any 
given government intervention. My only claim is that opportunity cost neglect is a 
real phenomenon that influences how people think about particular policy 
instruments. 
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B.  Opportunity Cost Neglect and the Choice of Climate Policy Instrument 
 
Section A described how opportunity cost neglect influences public policy 
generally. This Section focuses specifically on climate policies and argues that 
opportunity cost neglect influences public opinion regarding which policy 
instruments are best for addressing global warming. In particular, I maintain that 
opportunity cost neglect helps explain why command-and-control regulations and 
green subsidies are more popular among the public than a carbon tax. 
In surveys, a majority of Americans report their belief that global warming is 
real, that it results at least partly from human activity, and that the government ought 
to do something about it.130 The important question is what exactly should the 
government do. Which policy instruments does the public endorse?  
Based on the discussion in Section A, we can make four predictions about 
people who are convinced that global warming is a problem: (1) they will strongly 
support command-and-control regulations, such as fuel economy standards for 
automobiles; (2) they will strongly support subsidies to combat global warming, 
particularly if those subsidies are in the form of tax expenditures; (3) their support 
for regulations and subsidies will decrease if opinion researchers word questions in 
a way that makes opportunity costs salient; and (4) because it makes opportunity 
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140 UTAH LAW REVIEW [NO. 1 
costs salient, people will support a carbon tax less than regulations and subsidies 
despite strong economic arguments that the tax is superior. 
It turns out that all of these predictions are accurate. But before examining the 
evidence related to each prediction, I pause briefly to consider cap-and-trade. We 
cannot predict whether opportunity cost neglect will bias public opinion for or 
against cap-and-trade relative to a carbon tax. On one hand, the emissions cap in a 
cap-and-trade program is a form of command-and-control regulation, which, as we 
will see, the public generally finds more appealing than a carbon tax. On the other 
hand, in theory, cap-and-trade can function much like a carbon tax and opponents of 
the policy often label it as “cap and tax.”131 So, it is not clear whether the public 
thinks of cap-and-trade as a form of command-and-control or as similar to a carbon 
tax. In fact, public support for cap-and-trade varies greatly from one poll to another 
with a large number of people indicating that they have not formed an opinion.132 
 
1.  Support for Command-and-Control 
 
Section A argued that, in general, opportunity cost neglect biases the public in 
favor of regulation. The opportunity costs of regulation are implicit and therefore 
off screen. Regulation does not involve a government outlay that might trigger 
consideration of tradeoffs. So, while they are in fact costly, regulations appear to 
offer a free lunch—a painless way to address society’s problems.  
Against this backdrop and given the fact that most people claim to be concerned 
about global warming, we would expect the public to strongly support the 
government addressing climate change through command-and-control mechanisms. 
In fact, polls consistently show overwhelming support (often 70% or higher) for 
numerous regulations, including more stringent fuel efficiency standards for 
automobiles, requiring that half of all new cars produced be hybrid cars, and even 
mandatory caps on industry emissions.133  
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2017] BEHAVORIAL PUBLIC CHOICE AND THE CARBON TAX 141 
As a specific example, a recent poll conducted by The New York Times asked 
participants whether they thought “the government should or should not limit the 
amount of greenhouse gases that U.S. businesses put out.”134 Seventy-eight percent 
supported limiting emissions.135 Interestingly, in the same poll, only 75% of 
participants reported having an opinion about global warming that was at least 
“somewhat strong.”136 Apparently, people are so quick to express support for global 
warming regulations that some will do so even if they do not think climate change 
is much of a problem. In fact, in six nationally representative surveys of registered 
voters conducted over three years, the Yale Project on Climate Change 
Communication found that 56% of Republicans surveyed supported regulating 
carbon dioxide as a pollutant, despite the fact that only 44% were convinced that 
global warming was occurring!137 
 
2.  Support for Green Subsidies 
 
Section A also argued that opportunity cost neglect biases public opinion in 
favor of government spending and, to an even greater extent, tax expenditures. 
Unless explicitly prompted to consider tradeoffs, people eagerly support these two 
mechanisms for addressing perceived problems.  
Given this fact, we would expect the public to embrace government subsidies 
intended to combat global warming. Opinion research supports this conclusion. A 
substantial majority of the public (often exceeding 70%) favors green subsidies for 
industry and consumers, including tax incentives for utilities to switch to renewable 
energy; tax credits for consumers to buy energy efficient appliances and hybrid cars; 
and tax credits for coal-fired power plants that find ways to reduce pollution from 
their smokestacks.138 Moreover, Republican voters strongly support 
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environmentally friendly tax expenditures, such as tax rebates for people who buy 
solar panels and fuel-efficient cars.139 
 
3.  Diminishing Support When Opportunity Costs Are Salient 
 
If the public’s support for subsidies and command-and-control results largely 
from opportunity cost neglect, then it should decrease when pollsters word questions 
in a way that makes opportunity costs salient. Consistent with this hypothesis, polls 
that draw attention to costs generally do find lower levels of support than polls that 
do not.140  
But the most compelling evidence of opportunity cost neglect comes from polls 
that ask two versions of the same question—one version that identifies the policy 
without highlighting tradeoffs and one version that draws attention to tradeoffs. 
These polls find that making tradeoffs salient significantly reduces support for the 
policy in question. 
One example is the 2015 National Surveys on Energy and Environment.141 This 
poll found that 74% of those surveyed agreed that “state governments should require 
a set portion of all electricity to come from renewable energy sources such as wind 
and solar power.”142 But support for the proposal declined by over 20% when 
researchers added the phrase, “even if it increases the cost of electricity by about 25 
dollars per family per year.”143 The fact that mentioning a very small cost (around 
$2 per month per family) triggered such a large reduction in support suggests that 
many of those who expressed support in response to the first version of the question 
simply were not thinking about the tradeoffs involved. The second version of the 
question prompted them to consider the proposal’s opportunity cost and led to a 
decline in support. 
Similarly, a survey by the Nathan Cummings Foundation found that support for 
various climate change policies dropped dramatically from their initial levels when 
the survey questions were modified to highlight costs.144 For example, 84% of 
respondents initially supported a subsidy program described as follows: 
 
The Apollo Energy Act would invest $300 billion over 10 years to develop 
new, low-cost clean energy technologies and industries. The goal of the 
project would be to eliminate America’s dependence on foreign oil within 
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ten years, create jobs in new clean energy industries, and dramatically 
reduce US carbon emissions.145 
 
Nonetheless, in response to a subsequent question, 72% of respondents said they 
were less likely to support the program after having received the following 
information: “This proposal would cost hundreds of billions of dollars yet there is no 
plan for how to pay for it. That means that either our taxes will go up or the federal 
deficit will increase.”146 The fact that the clean energy subsidy described in this 
survey would necessitate tradeoffs should have been obvious even without this 
additional language. After all, the original version of the survey question explicitly 
stated that the government “would invest $300 billion” in the project.147 But even 
when opportunity costs should be obvious, the public often fails to consider them 
unless pollsters make them painfully explicit. 
 
4.  Lack of Support for a Carbon Tax 
 
Recall the study by Eva Mueller in which she found that support for increased 
government spending dissipated when she asked study participants whether they 
would be willing to pay taxes to fund it. Mueller’s study suggests that, in contrast to 
questions that ask only about spending, the mere mention of taxes causes people to 
think about opportunity costs. Similarly, the 2010 version of the National Survey of 
American Public Opinion on Climate Change found that support for a carbon tax 
was the same (i.e., 32%) whether the poll mentioned a cost of $15 per month or 
mentioned no cost at all.148 In other words, contrary to what we have seen for 
regulation and subsidies, support for a carbon tax does not diminish simply because 
the pollster mentions a small cost. This suggests that simply hearing the words 
“carbon tax” triggers consideration of tradeoffs in a way that questions about 
regulation and subsidies do not.  
As a result, we would expect that a carbon tax, despite its favored status among 
economists, will be less popular with the public than regulation and subsidies. To 
put it mildly, the evidence comports with this prediction. Polls generally find that 
less than 40% of the public supports addressing global warming via a broad-based 
carbon tax or through taxes on gasoline, electricity, or natural gas.149 
  
                                                      
145 Id. at 5.  
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148 See Borick et al., supra note 132, at 12. 
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III.  IMPLICATIONS FOR CARBON TAX ADVOCATES AND OPPONENTS AND FOR 
PUBLIC POLICY 
 
Part II argued that opportunity cost neglect helps explain why the public favors 
command-and-control regulation and green subsidies over a carbon tax. This Part 
discusses some important ramifications of opportunity cost neglect for both carbon 
tax advocates and opponents. I also argue that the influence of opportunity cost 
neglect will cause any real-world carbon tax to be less efficient than traditional 
economic analysis suggests. 
 
A.  Reducing the Salience of Carbon Tax Opportunity Costs 
 
One potentially important implication of the discussion in Part II is that carbon 
tax proponents could increase public support for a carbon tax by making the 
opportunity costs less salient. A recent New York Times poll suggests one technique 
for accomplishing this objective.150 The poll began with the following question: 
 
For each of the following, please tell me whether you favor or oppose it as 
a way for the federal government to try to reduce future global warming. 
Each of these changes would increase the amount of money that you pay 
for things you buy. Increasing taxes on electricity so people use less of 
it?151 
 
Predictably, only 25% of respondents supported the electricity tax.152 A 
similarly worded question asking about increasing the gas tax elicited only 36% 
support.153 As discussed in Part II, these findings are consistent with numerous polls 
on carbon and similar taxes conducted by a variety of pollsters over a long period of 
time.  
The interesting finding in the Times poll came in response to the following 
follow-up question: “Do you think the federal government should or should not 
require companies to pay a tax to the government for every ton of greenhouse gases 
the companies put out?”154 
In response, 61% of those polled answered yes.155 What is strange about this 
result is that a carbon tax imposed on “companies” would largely be passed through 
to consumers, thereby increasing the price of all carbon-intensive goods, including 
electricity and gasoline.156  
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So, why would people who strongly oppose electricity and gas taxes also 
strongly support a carbon tax as long as it is imposed on “companies”? A number of 
possibilities exist. But the simplest and most plausible explanation is that many 
Americans do not understand basic economics. They instead subscribe to what 
economists derisively refer to as the flypaper theory of tax incidence. In other words, 
they believe that the burden of a tax, like a fly landing on flypaper, sticks where it 
first lands.157 They do not believe that a carbon tax imposed on “companies” will 
trickle down to consumers. This view is consistent with a Yale University poll that 
found that support for a carbon tax on “fossil fuel companies” fell from 55% to 36% 
when researchers added language to the question indicating that the tax would cost 
the average household $180 per year.158 
The New York Times and Yale University polls suggest that when poll 
questions emphasize that a carbon tax will be imposed on firms rather than 
consumers, the opportunity costs of the tax become less salient. In their 
communications, then, carbon tax advocates may want to frame the tax as the price 
that firms have to pay because they pollute rather than a cost that consumers must 
incur to keep the planet from warming. This technique, however, is deceptive given 
that firms generally will pass the tax through to consumers.  
The public’s failure to understand the economics of taxation presents a second 
possibility for reducing the salience of opportunity costs. As discussed in Part II, the 
likely reason that opportunity costs are more salient for a carbon tax than for 
regulations is that paying taxes involves an out-of-pocket expenditure by taxpayers. 
The prospect of paying the tax highlights the existence of tradeoffs. Ironically, from 
society’s perspective, the payment of the tax does not itself represent a cost; it is 
simply a transfer from the taxpayer to the government, which the government can 
use to fund public goods or could return to the public via tax cuts or a rebate check.159 
                                                      
157 See BERNARD SALANIÉ, THE ECONOMICS OF TAXATION 41 (2d ed. 2011); cf. HSU, 
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fund cuts to existing taxes. See Nordhaus, supra note 28, at 305–06. 
The second caveat stems from the possibility of rent-seeking costs and inefficient 
transfers. If special interest groups lobby Congress for handouts funded by carbon tax 
revenue, the lobbying activity represents a real resource cost of the tax. Similarly, if Congress 
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In reality, the social cost of a carbon tax consists of the resources that society uses 
and the opportunities that people must forgo to reduce carbon emissions.160 For 
example, power companies will switch from cheap fossil fuels to more expensive 
alternatives, increasing their costs. Higher electricity prices will force consumers to 
either conserve energy or cut back on consumption of other goods. Similarly, higher 
gasoline and jet fuel prices mean that people will drive and fly less than they would 
otherwise prefer. These sacrifices, and not the payment of the tax, constitute the true 
social cost of mitigating global warming. 
The public’s confusion on this point creates an opportunity for carbon tax 
proponents. Pointing out that tax payments represent transfers rather than social 
costs should reduce the salience of opportunity costs. One way to do this is to 
highlight the potential uses of carbon tax revenue.  
Consistent with this hypothesis, a recent Michigan University poll found that 
support for the carbon tax increases if the poll question specifies that the government 
will return all tax revenues in the form of a rebate check or will dedicate carbon tax 
revenue to subsidizing renewable energy.161 Specifically, the poll found that only 
34% of those surveyed supported a carbon tax when the question did not specify 
what the government would do with the revenue.162 Support increased to 56% when 
the question indicated that the government would send rebate checks and to 60% if 
the government subsidized renewable energy programs.163  
Drawing attention to potential uses of carbon tax revenue does not raise the 
same concerns about deception as do attempts to market the tax as a penalty paid by 
polluters. The reason is that certain uses of carbon tax revenue will in fact reduce 
the overall cost of mitigating climate change. But details matter. The most efficient 
way to use carbon tax revenue is to reduce the deficit (thereby avoiding future tax 
increases) or to cut distortionary taxes (especially taxes on capital).164 Relative to 
cutting distortionary taxes, mailing out rebate checks increases costs because it does 
nothing to increase incentives to work and save.165 Similarly, the government could 
potentially benefit society by spending carbon tax revenue on valuable public goods, 
including research and development related to renewable energy. But increasing 
spending would reduce efficiency unless the spending provides benefits at least as 
large as those that would stem from the forgone tax cuts,166 and this is questionable 
given the many rent-seeking interest groups that would lobby Congress for their 
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share of the carbon tax pie. In addition, while polls show some support for using 
carbon tax revenue to fund rebate checks and subsidies for renewable energy, they 
also show much less support for using the revenue to cut taxes or reduce the 
deficit.167 In other words, the potential uses of revenue that appeal to the public tend 
to be those that would make a carbon tax less efficient.   
Moreover, educating the public about how the government might efficiently 
use carbon tax revenue could prove difficult. Americans are notoriously uninformed 
about policy matters in general168 and assuming that a large fraction of the public 
will learn the nuances of carbon tax policy is dubious to say the least.169 And even 
if the message gets through, people may not take politicians at face value when they 
make promises about how they will spend the government’s newfound treasure.170  
 
B.  Drawing Attention to the Opportunity Costs of Other Policies 
 
Rather than trying to make the opportunity costs of a carbon tax less salient, 
carbon tax proponents might try instead to make the opportunity costs of regulations 
and subsidies more salient.171 The objective would be to increase the appeal of the 
carbon tax vis-à-vis alternative policies by pointing out that those policies would in 
fact cost more.  
A potential problem with this strategy is the possibility that it may backfire. 
Rather than encouraging support for a carbon tax, it could simply cause the public 
to lose enthusiasm for other forms of government intervention.   
In fact, public opinion research suggests that this might happen. As discussed 
in detail below, people tell pollsters that they are concerned about climate change 
and want the government to act, but they also express doubts about the seriousness 
and immediacy of the threat. Moreover, survey evidence suggests that the public is 
unwilling to make the sacrifices needed to seriously address the problem. In other 
words, regulations and subsidies may appeal to the public precisely because they 
conceal tradeoffs. We have already seen that support for these policies declines when 
pollsters draw attention to the tradeoffs they entail. As a result, highlighting the costs 
of regulations and subsidies will not suddenly make the carbon tax the public’s 
policy instrument of choice. 
  
                                                      
167 Amdur et al., supra note 149, at 1 (finding that only 38% of those surveyed support 
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If this analysis is correct, then, from the perspective of carbon tax proponents, 
the problem with public opinion is on the benefit side of the ledger as well as on the 
cost side. Advocates of a carbon tax do not simply need to convince people that 
alternative policies impose unnecessary costs. They must also succeed in the perhaps 
even more difficult task of persuading the public that global warming presents a 
danger that society should mitigate even if doing so requires sacrifices. 
A number of findings support the conclusion that the public is not seriously 
committed to taking costly action to prevent global warming. First, while a 
substantial majority of the public claims to be concerned about global warming, only 
a minority expresses serious concern, and many people acknowledge that they have 
doubts.172 For example, in a recent New York Times poll, only 42% of those 
surveyed stated that global warming is an extremely or very important issue to them 
personally.173 Similarly, in a recent Yale University poll, only 37% stated that they 
are extremely or very sure that global warming is happening.174 
Second, when researchers ask the public about policy priorities, taking steps to 
address global warming ranks low on the list.175 For example, a recent poll by the 
Pew Research Center found that only 38% of adults believe that President Obama 
and the Congress should make global warming a top priority, which placed climate 
change behind twenty-one other issues about which the public is more concerned.176  
Third, while people believe that global warming will cause significant damage 
in the distant future, many do not believe that it poses an immediate threat that will 
affect them personally. For example, in a recent New York Times poll, 59% of those 
surveyed stated that if left unchecked, global warming would hurt future generations 
either a great deal or a lot.177 But only 34% thought that they personally will be hurt 
a great deal or a lot, while 45% stated they would suffer only a little or not at all.178 
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Finally, it is unlikely that the public is currently willing to incur the costs that 
experts believe are necessary to significantly reduce damage caused by global 
warming. Based upon a detailed cost-benefit analysis, William Nordhaus concludes 
that the optimal worldwide climate policy would seek to limit global warming to 
between two and three degrees Celsius above preindustrial levels.179 Nordhaus also 
finds that achieving this goal would cost between 0.5% and 1.5% of global income 
on an annual basis.180  
Moreover, Nordhaus’s cost estimate may be too low. First, Nordhaus’s estimate 
assumes (unrealistically) that all countries participate in climate change mitigation 
efforts and adopt economically efficient policies, such as carbon taxes, rather than 
inefficient regulations.181  
Second, Nordhaus’s analysis ignores possible climate tipping points, which are 
highly unpredictable environmental changes, such as the collapse of the Gulf 
Stream, that scientists speculate might occur as the globe warms and that would 
likely produce extreme environmental and economic damage.182 Nordhaus leaves 
tipping points out of his analysis because they are difficult to model, but he points 
out that the possibility that they exist “will generally lower the optimal [temperature] 
target to provide insurance against the worst-case outcomes.”183 (Partly for this 
reason, the Paris Agreement on climate change states that signatory countries will 
take steps to limit global warming to less than two degrees Celsius.184) Moreover, a 
recent study by Thomas Lontzek and his colleagues concludes that adding tipping 
points to Nordhaus’s model would significantly increase the optimal carbon tax, 
which would also increase the cost of climate change mitigation.185 
Is the public willing to pay the cost? The answer is almost certainly no, at least 
not if the cost is transparent. A World Bank poll asked Americans whether they 
would support “taking steps against climate change [that] would increase costs to 
the average person for energy and other products by” either $38.93 per month (or 
1% of per capita GDP) or $19.47 per month (or 0.5% of per capita GDP).186 A 
majority stated that they were willing to pay the lower amount but not the higher  
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amount.187 Other surveys have found even less support for expensive measures. In 
general, polls find majority support for policies that would impose a small cost,188 
but not for policies that are even moderately expensive.189 
In addition, not only is the public’s stated willingness to pay for climate policies 
low relative to expert cost estimates, but stated willingness to pay likely overstates 
what people are in fact willing to pay. Talk is cheap, and telling a pollster that you 
are willing to spend money to protect the environment does not require that you 
actually incur a cost. Rather, it is an inexpensive way to confirm to yourself and to 
the pollster that you are a good person who is willing to sacrifice to make the world 
a better place. A number of studies find that people are more willing to spend 
hypothetical money in the context of surveys and experiments than they are to spend 
real money.190 In particular, when asked about their willingness to pay for 
environmental goods, people frequently state very high amounts that constitute an 
unrealistically large part of their incomes.191 
In sum, public support for serious action on climate change may be more 
apparent than real. People claim to be concerned about global warming, but are not 
willing to make the sacrifices that experts argue are needed to significantly reduce 
carbon emissions. This suggests that increasing support for a carbon tax will require 
more than simply pointing out that alternative policies necessitate tradeoffs. Carbon 
tax advocates will also have to convince the public that addressing global warming 
is important enough to warrant sacrifice. 
 
C.  A Pyrrhic Victory for Carbon Tax Opponents? 
 
Conservative groups that oppose the carbon tax often interpret the lack of public 
support for the policy as evidence of success.192 But to the extent that these groups 
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are motivated by a desire to avoid climate policies generally, rather than a carbon 
tax in particular, then their victory may prove hollow. While the public does not take 
climate change as seriously as many climate scientists, people do believe that global 
warming is a problem. In addition, the public overwhelmingly favors green subsidies 
and command-and-control regulations as the preferred solution precisely because 
these policies conceal opportunity costs. The public’s continued belief in a free 
lunch—a costless solution to the global warming problem—very likely makes 
government intervention inevitable.  
In fact, the government is already using command-and-control regulation and 
green subsidies to address global warming. Moreover, both the pace and scope of 
interventions are increasing. For example, in recent years, the federal government 
has adopted regulations dramatically increasing automobile fuel efficiency standards 
and substantially strengthening energy efficiency standards for appliances and other 
equipment.193 As we have seen, the public generally approves of these efforts despite 
the fact that the current approach will likely prove more expensive and less effective 
than an economy-wide carbon tax. 
Given the high likelihood that the government will continue to increase its 
efforts to combat global warming, a number of conservative and libertarian scholars 
have begun to argue for a carbon tax.194 In response, some conservative 
policymakers have objected that, because of strong opposition to the carbon tax 
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among Republican voters, any conservative politician who embraced the policy 
would be committing political suicide.195  
Nonetheless, conservative policymakers should keep three points in mind. 
First, as discussed in the Introduction, the EPA recently adopted the Clean Power 
Plan, which imposes state-specific limits on carbon emissions from power plants.196 
The EPA’s regulations give each state a lot of flexibility to determine exactly what 
policies it will adopt to achieve the emissions reductions required within its borders. 
One possibility is that the states would use carbon taxes.197 By vocally opposing this 
option, conservative policymakers may inadvertently facilitate the adoption of less 
efficient policies, including excessively complicated and expensive regulatory 
schemes. In other words, conservative policymakers who oppose action on climate 
change are on the horns of a dilemma. Do they oppose a carbon tax knowing that 
this may lead to expensive regulations and subsidies? Or should they accept a carbon 
tax because they regard it as the lesser evil?198 
Second, several recent polls show that a majority of Republicans now believe 
that climate change is occurring.199 And as we have seen, many Republican voters 
support action on climate change. The problem is that they support wasteful and 
ineffective policies. As a result, the conservative cause would arguably be better 
served if conservative leaders participated in shaping the government’s response to 
global warming rather than maintaining that the government should not respond at 
all—a position that has fallen out of favor with the public, including many 
Republican voters.  
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Finally, to the extent that conservative policymakers believe that a carbon tax 
is preferable to alternative climate policies, they may be able to persuade 
conservative voters to change their minds. A study by Robert Brulle and his 
colleagues found that cues from Republican politicians, including public statements 
about climate change and votes on climate change bills, have a significant effect on 
people’s views about climate change.200 Given that conservative leaders have long 
argued in favor of lower taxes and have specifically argued against the carbon tax,201 
switching positions now would no doubt incite some resistance among Republican 
voters. But we have reason to believe that Republican elites can influence voter 
opinion on this issue. 
 
D.  Why Opportunity Cost Neglect Will Make the Carbon Tax Less Efficient 
 
Up to this point, I have argued that opportunity cost neglect explains why the 
public supports green subsidies and command-and-control, but not a carbon tax. In 
this Section, I discuss the possibility that opportunity cost neglect would make any 
real-world carbon tax less efficient than traditional economic models suggest.  
Some economists argue that, in theory, an optimal climate policy would 
combine a carbon tax with carefully crafted subsidies for basic research related to 
climate change and for renewable energy, and perhaps even with narrowly tailored 
regulations.202 But in the real world, political forces rather than environmental 
objectives often determine which activities the government subsidizes and how it 
regulates.203 Moreover, using carbon tax revenue to fund subsidies could increase 
the program’s cost by precluding cuts to distortionary taxes.204 So, part of the appeal 
of a broad-based carbon tax is that by pricing all carbon emissions, it generally 
serves as a substitute for deeply flawed alternative policies.205 In other words, it 
largely eliminates the need for both subsidies and command-and-control.206  
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The public, however, is likely to view the carbon tax as a complement to these 
other policies rather than as a substitute. Part II argued that opportunity cost neglect 
causes people to view command-and-control and subsidies as providing a free 
lunch—environmental benefits at no cost. If that view is correct, then even if the 
public ultimately becomes comfortable with a carbon tax, it will not necessarily sour 
on these psychologically appealing alternatives. Why not combine a carbon tax with 
mandates requiring power companies to use renewable energy? Better yet, why not 
use carbon tax revenue to fund tax credits for hybrid cars? 
In addition, the public will likely be particularly receptive to exempting certain 
sectors of the economy from a carbon tax (or applying lower rates to some 
sectors).207 Recall that opportunity cost neglect biases people in favor of tax 
expenditures. If the government imposed a carbon tax, adding exemptions to it 
would constitute a form of tax expenditure. If, as existing evidence suggests, the 
public would view these exemptions as imposing no cost, then politicians would 
have every reason to hand them out to favored constituencies. 
Moreover, the public will not be alone in its support for regulations, subsidies, 
and exemptions. On the one hand, environmental groups will support regulations 
and, in some cases, subsidies.208 These groups generally favor more government 
intervention on behalf of the environment, not less. Many environmentalists are also 
generally skeptical of pricing pollution and prefer command-and-control 
mechanisms instead.209 On the other hand, industry groups will fight for both 
subsidies and exemptions as well as regulations if those regulations create barriers 
to entry or otherwise harm competitors. 
Given the political environment, we should expect that any carbon tax enacted 
into law in the United States will contain significant exemptions and will also be 
accompanied by subsidies and command-and-control regulation. In fact, the closest 
that the country has come to adopting a law that approximates a carbon tax was the 
Waxman-Markey cap-and-trade bill that passed the House of Representatives in 
2009 before ultimately dying in the Senate.210 In addition to creating a cap-and-trade 
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program, the Waxman-Markey bill contained numerous and detailed regulations; 
billions of dollars of subsidies for oil refineries, the coal industry, and other special 
interest groups, and exemptions for important industries.211 Similarly, carbon taxes 
enacted in countries such as Norway, Finland, Sweden, and Denmark contain 
exemptions for certain industries.212  
Taking for granted that any real-world carbon tax will be accompanied by 
regulations, subsidies, and exemptions, why does that matter? The reason is that 
these carbon tax add-ons will increase the cost of addressing global warming while 
providing little if any benefit.213  
As explained in Part I, the objective of a carbon tax is to impose a uniform price 
on all carbon emissions, which provides all sources of emissions with the same 
incentive to abate. In theory, all sources will abate emissions until the marginal cost 
of doing so exceeds the tax. Thus, all sources will face the same marginal cost of 
abatement so that no opportunity exists to increase efficiency by reallocating 
abatement from one economic sector to another. By contrast, regulations, 
exemptions, and subsidies can cause the marginal cost of abatement to vary across 
sectors, which means that it would be possible to achieve the same level of emissions 
reduction at a lower cost or a higher level of emissions reduction at the same cost. 
Moreover, using carbon tax revenue to fund subsidies can itself impose real 
costs on society. First, revenue used in this way cannot also be used to cut 
distortionary taxes. The failure to use carbon tax revenue to cut existing taxes could 
substantially increase the cost of addressing global warming.214  
Second, handing out green subsidies encourages rent-seeking industry groups 
to squander resources lobbying Congress to fund projects that may very well 
constitute bad investments. Recall from Part I that the government has a poor record 
when it comes to choosing which ostensibly environmentally friendly technologies 
it should subsidize. It is easy to recognize that the government wastes resources 
when it builds bridges to nowhere. While less obvious, the same is also true when 
the government subsidizes technologies that are doomed to fail or that are 
counterproductive. 
In sum, opportunity cost neglect will likely make any carbon tax adopted by 
the United States less efficient than economic theory suggests. Not only will special 
interest groups lobby for expensive add-ons in the form of regulations, subsidies, 
and exemptions, but they will find a convenient ally in the public, which generally 
ignores the costs of these policies.  
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Although they do not highlight the role played by opportunity cost neglect, 
some influential conservatives and libertarians have expressed skepticism that the 
carbon tax will supplant regulations and subsidies.215 While the analysis in this 
Section supports that conclusion, I caution that this does not mean that on net, the 
benefits of a carbon tax do not outweigh the costs. In particular, as discussed in 
Section C of this Part, significant action to mitigate climate change is highly 
probable. In the absence of a carbon tax, the government is and will likely continue 
to address the problem using costly and ineffective means. Moreover, conservatives 
and libertarians have long argued that disasters and emergencies often facilitate 
permanent and harmful expansions of government power.216 If the globe continues 
to warm, then pressure for the government to take drastic action will increase 
substantially.  
In light of these considerations, some conservative and libertarian thinkers have 
recently begun to promote the idea of a grand bargain with environmentalists.217 The 
bargain would entail a policy swap in which conservatives would agree to a revenue-
neutral carbon tax and environmentalists would agree to the repeal of existing green 
subsidies and global warming regulations and to limiting the ability of federal 
agencies to regulate carbon emissions in the future.  
Robert Murphy, an influential conservative and a critic of the policy swap 
proposal, has argued that it is unrealistic to believe that environmentalists, 
politicians, and bureaucrats would agree to it in the first place.218 Moreover, even if 
the bargain were struck, Murphy claims that it would unravel over time as special 
interest groups and power-seeking bureaucrats work to impose new regulations and 
subsidies in addition to the existing carbon tax.219  
On one hand, because certain special interest groups favor regulations and 
subsidies and because the public views these policies as imposing little or no cost, 
Murphy is right that they will be difficult to eliminate. On the other hand, Murphy’s 
position rests on the implicit assumption that conservatives will best advance their 
goal of limited government by continuing to oppose virtually any significant climate 
policies. This Article calls that claim into question.  
For advocates of small government, the question then is whether promoting a 
carbon tax that will be imperfect in practice, but that limits the role of regulation and 
                                                      
215 Jeffrey Miron, Do We Need New Climate Change Guidelines?, ORANGE COUNTY 
REGISTER (July 29, 2013), http://www.ocregister.com/articles/carbon-518840-tax-
policies.html [https://perma.cc/N7UJ-CQ8L]; Robert Murphy, Jerry Taylor Shows the 
Weakness of a Case for a Carbon Tax, INST. FOR ENERGY RESEARCH (Mar. 26, 2015), 
http://instituteforenergyresearch.org/analysis/jerry-taylor-shows-the-weakness-of-case-for-
a-carbon-tax/ [https://perma.cc/962Z-SACT]. 
216 See generally ROBERT HIGGS, CRISIS AND LEVIATHAN: CRITICAL EPISODES IN THE 
GROWTH OF AMERICAN GOVERNMENT 3–4 (1987) (making this argument). 
217 See supra text accompanying note 23. 
218 Murphy, supra note 215. For a response, see Jerry Taylor, Debating the Carbon Tax, 
NISKANEN CENTER (Mar. 30, 2015), https://niskanencenter.org/blog/debating-the-carbon-
tax/ [https://perma.cc/5SMY-7FD5]. 
219 Murphy, supra note 215. 
2017] BEHAVORIAL PUBLIC CHOICE AND THE CARBON TAX 157 
subsidies, is better than accepting the government’s current approach focusing on 
regulation and subsidies. With respect to this point, the economist Tom Tietenberg 
has reviewed studies of existing pollution and carbon pricing schemes, and he 
concludes that “they typically find that the cost savings from shifting to [taxes or 
cap-and-trade] are considerable, but less than would have been achieved if the final 
outcome had been fully cost effective.”220   
Tietenberg’s findings suggest that, at the very least, conservatives should be 
open to the idea of negotiating with environmentalists for a carbon tax, at least as 
long as it largely supplants existing regulations and subsidies. In spite of unyielding 
conservative opposition, the government has been and likely will continue to take 
significant action on global warming using inefficient measures, and it is doing so 
with strong public support, some of which comes from Republican voters. Once 
regulations and subsidies become entrenched, they will be hard to repeal.221 
Arguably then, conservatives would better advance their goals by playing a 
constructive role early on in the process of developing the nation’s policy response 
to global warming. After all, what is the harm in advocating a less expensive and 
more effective approach while continuing to oppose wasteful alternatives, especially 
when the current practice among conservatives of denying the importance of climate 
change has largely failed to achieve the goal of thwarting government action? 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
This Article contributes to the emerging literature in behavioral public choice 
by showing how opportunity cost neglect influences public opinion regarding 
climate change policy. The public favors command-and-control regulations and 
green subsidies because these policy instruments conceal opportunity costs. 
Paradoxically, the carbon tax, which is the most efficient instrument available, 
attracts little public support because it draws attention to tradeoffs. The challenge 
presented to carbon tax advocates is convincing the public that mitigating global 
warming is an objective worthy of sacrifice when the public believes that regulations  
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and subsidies offer a free lunch. Opposition by conservatives makes this task 
difficult. But conservatives should consider whether defeating the carbon tax simply 
paves the way for less efficient alternatives that entail greater government intrusion 
in people’s lives, but that the public strongly supports. 
